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This paper evaluates the monetary and macroprudential policies that mitigate the procyclicality arising
from the interlinkages between current account deﬁcits and ﬁnancial vulnerabilities. We develop a
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with heterogeneous households
and collateralised debt. The model predicts that external shocks are important in driving current account
deﬁcits that are coupled with run-ups in house prices and household debt. In this context, optimal policy
features an interest-rate response to credit and a LTV ratio that countercyclically responds to house price
dynamics. By allowing an interest-rate response to changes in ﬁnancial variables, the monetary policy
authority improves social welfare, because of the large welfare gains accrued to the Savers. The additional
use of a countercyclical LTV ratio that responds to house prices, increases the ability of borrowers to
smooth consumption over the cycle and is Pareto improving. Domestic and foreign shocks account for
a similar fraction of the welfare gains delivered by such a policy.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction increased policy makers interest in policies that could mitigate theBetween 1974 and 2006, U.S. house prices and households
leverage increased by about 60 and 20 per cent, respectively. See
Fig. 1. The housing developments were also associated with a
growing current account deﬁcit which reached 6 per cent of GDP
by the end of 2006. The global transmission of such vulnerabilitiesprocyclicality arising from the interlinkages between global imbal-
ances and domestic ﬁnancial vulnerabilities.
This paper evaluates various policy actions. We begin by
revisiting the long standing debate on wether monetary policy
should react to ﬁnancial cycles. We contribute to the debate by con-
sidering a direct response to either credit or house prices in the inter-
est-rate rule of the central bank. We also explore the effects of
macroprudential policy, given the recent policy debate which ques-
tions the traditional (micro) focus of ﬁnancial stability policies and
suggests the need for preventive (macro-prudential) policies that
mitigate ﬁnancial cycles and their economy-wide effects. We focus
on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as amacroprudential tool and assess
the ability of LTV ratio policies to provide a stable provision of loans
to households in the face of both domestic and external shocks.1 The
use of dynamic macroprudential policy requirements has been sug-
gested by The Basel Committee on the Global Financial System.2restrain
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Fig. 1. Current Account (%gdp) (right axes) vs Real House Price (left panel, left axes) and Real Home Mortgage to House Value (right panel, left axes).
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the interlinkages between global imbalances and ﬁnancial vulner-
abilities through the lens of a stochastic general equilibrium
model. First, we develop a two-country dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with heterogeneous households and
collateral constraints. At the core of the model is the borrowers-
lenders setup developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
extended to the household sector by Iacoviello (2005). The domes-
tic economy features two types of households that differ in terms
of the rate at which they discount the future. In equilibrium, one
type of households borrows whereas the other type lends. Credit
constraints arise because lenders cannot force borrowers to repay.
Thus, houses are also used as loan collateral in the domestic credit
market. We assume that the foreign economy is populated by sav-
ers and runs a current account surplus. The foreign economy is
thus willing to extend credit to the domestic economy and ﬁnance
their current account deﬁcit.3
We consider both domestic and external sources of economic
ﬂuctuations. Capital inﬂow shocks are modeled as both preference
shocks to the foreign economy and as risk premium shocks. A posi-
tive shock to preferences makes foreign agents more patient and,
thus, more willing to save, while a lower risk premium makes for-
eign borrowing less costly. We show that foreign shocks lead to
both an increase in capital inﬂows and a persistent current account
deﬁcit. The greater availability of foreign funds leads to an increase
in domestic consumption and housing investment. Due to a higher
demand for housing, house prices rise, exacerbating the ﬁnancial
accelerator effect linked to the existence of housing collateral.
Domestic shocks, such as housing preference shocks and credit
shocks, generate similar results. However, in the calibrated version
of the model, foreign shocks explain around 50 per cent of the vol-
atility of the current account and 20 per cent of the variability of
house prices. Monetary policy shocks account for about 30 per cent
of the volatility in the current account but do not have a substan-
tial effect on house prices. Housing preference shocks are an
important driver of house prices and household credit but only
explain a limited fraction of ﬂuctuations in the current account.
In this model’s context, we explore the beneﬁts of policies that
target changes in ﬁnancial variables. We start by exploring
whether monetary policy should explicitly recognize ﬁnancial3 Close economy models of the housing market with borrowing constraints have
been developed by Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). For open
economy extensions, see Christensen et al. (2013) for a small open economy and
Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) and Punzi (2013) for two-country economy versions,
among others.stability goals. To this end we investigate the optimality of an
interest-rate response to changes in ﬁnancial variables. Further,
we investigate whether the use of dynamic LTV ratio policies can
raise social welfare above what monetary policy could achieve by
allowing for an interest-rate response to ﬁnancial variables. Thus,
we assess the additional beneﬁts of allowing the LTV ratio to vary
in a counter-cyclical manner. We ﬁrst consider the optimal inter-
est-rate response to changes in household credit or house-prices.
We then search for the optimal LTV ratio response to variables that
reﬂect domestic or global ﬁnancial cycles. In order to draw mean-
ingful conclusions about the desirability of alternative policies, we
compare their performance on the basis of welfare criteria.
Our results show that an interest-rate response to changes in
ﬁnancial variables reduces macroeconomic volatility. In particular,
an interest rate that directly responds to ﬂuctuations in household
credit is preferred in terms of social welfare. However, we ﬁnd that
the social welfare gains associated with this policy are due to the
large welfare gains accrued to the Savers. An interest rate response
to household credit reduces the volatility of both ﬁnancial vari-
ables and the real interest rate. This results in a reduction in the
volatility of the interest income of Savers which helps to stabilize
their housing investment and consumption over the business
cycle. At the same time, by reducing the volatility of ﬁnancial vari-
ables, this policy limits the ampliﬁcation effect of the collateral
constraint and, thus, the Borrowers’ ability to invest and consume.
As a result, the welfare of one group of agents is increased at the
cost of a reduction in the welfare of the other group.
We argue that the additional use of a countercyclical LTV ratio
that optimally responds to changes in house prices improves social
welfare relative to a constant LTV ratio policy. Limiting leverage
and domestic borrowing capacity during periods of expansion
and facilitating the use of credit during recessionary periods helps
Borrowers to smooth consumption over time. In particular, the LTV
ratio rule that optimally responds to ﬂuctuations in house prices
eliminates the trade-off between the Savers’ and Borrowers’ wel-
fare. Thus, a policy that optimally combines an interest rate
response to household credit with the use of dynamic require-
ments for the loan-to-value (LTV) ratios is Pareto improving.
Further, in terms of stabilization effects, this policy is more suc-
cessful than others in reducing the volatility of both ﬁnancial vari-
ables and the real interest rate. The analysis conducted in this
paper does not target the smoothing out of speciﬁc shocks. By
investigating the importance of varying sources of ﬂuctuations,
we ﬁnd that the optimality of this policy is not driven by particular
shocks. Indeed, domestic and foreign shocks account for a similar
fraction of the welfare gains delivered by such a policy.
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reviews the related literature. Section 2 presents the details of
the model. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model. Sec-
tion 4 reports the quantitative implications and the dynamics of
the model. Sections 5 describes the welfare analysis and Section 6
presents the results under the optimized rules. Section 7 presents
some additional results and Section 8 concludes.
1.1. Related literature
The connection between global imbalances and the build-up of
domestic ﬁnancial imbalances has been widely recognized.4
Bernanke (2005) and Bernanke (2010) introduced the ‘‘global saving
glut hypothesis’’, which argued that countries running current
account surpluses have contributed to the permissive ﬁnancial con-
ditions in the U.S. and encouraged the recent credit boom. Several
authors have documented that large capital inﬂows have been used
to ﬁnance the U.S. economy, notably the housing market, during
periods of low domestic saving rates (e.g. Bertaut et al. (2012), Sa
and Wieladek (2011), Sa et al. (2012), Tillmann (2013) and
Warnock and Warnock (2009)). Other authors have instead shown
that the liberalization of the domestic ﬁnancial market was the dri-
ver behind house price dynamics (e.g. Favilukis et al. (2013)) while
some have argued that the run-up in house prices in the U.S. was
mainly due to loose monetary policy (e.g. Taylor (2007), Bracke
and Fidora (2012) and Borio and Disyatat (2011)).
Recently, the interaction between global imbalances and the
dynamics of house prices and household debt has also been ana-
lyzed using DSGE models. Ferrero (2013) links current account def-
icits to house prices in a New-Keynesian open economy model in
which the U.S. borrows from a representative international saver.
He ﬁnds that a looser monetary policy combined with lower collat-
eral requirements can explain about 60 per cent of the increase in
real house prices and about 25 per cent of the current account def-
icit since the 2000s. Other authors explore the interlinkages
between domestic and global imbalances in open economy models
augmented with domestic borrowers and lenders, and collateral-
ized household debt. In particular, Justiniano et al. (2014) argue
that the dynamics of foreign capital ﬂows account for between
one fourth and one third of the recent cycle in the U.S. house prices
and household debt, respectively. Punzi (2013) shows that in a
two-country real business cycle model rising housing prices gener-
ate a long-lasting accumulation of external debt, inducing high
investment and low savings. As a result, an economy with a boom-
ing housing market needs to ﬁnance its consumption and invest-
ment by accumulating long-lasting foreign debt which result in a
current account deﬁcit. This effect is ampliﬁed by high ﬁnancial
integration and ﬁnancial deregulation. Our paper is similar to the
above papers in that we develop a model that links house prices
and current account dynamics. However, we use a more complex
setup that allows us to: (1) account for both domestic and external
shocks as potential sources of ﬂuctuation in both house prices and
the current account; (2) assess the importance of dynamic LTV
ratio requirements in the mortgage market as well as their interac-
tion with monetary policy. Therefore, we develop a stochastic gen-
eral equilibriummodel that combines the presence of interlinkages
between the housing market and the current account, as in Ferrero
(2013), with the presence of domestic borrowers and lenders, as in4 The build up of ﬁnancial and global imbalances in advanced economies has been
at the center of policy and academic debates even before the recent crisis. Indeed,
while during the period of the Great Moderation many variables showed reduced
volatility, the volatility of international capital ﬂows increased, thereby increasing the
vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system. See Obstfeld (2012) and Borio and Disyatat
(2011). Fogli and Perri (2006) argue that the decreasing volatility in the U.S. business
cycle during the period of the Great Moderation has generated the large and
persistent U.S. current account deﬁcit.Justiniano et al. (2014) and Punzi (2013).5 For the purpose of our
paper, it seems necessary to distinguish between a domestic credit
market and international capital ﬂows. Indeed, investigating the role
of LTV ratio policies while at the same time abstracting from the
presence of a domestic credit market does not allow us to
distinguish between policies that regulate lending to domestic
households and those aimed at regulating international ﬁnancial
ﬂows.6 Since mortgages are mainly funded through the domestic
mortgage market, it would not be realistic to assume that changes
in the LTV ratio policies also apply to cross border lending. Therefore,
we develop a model that distinguish between international and
domestic credit ﬂows.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on macropru-
dential policy. Several previous papers have explored the effects of
macroprudential tools using stochastic general equilibriummodels
(e.g. Angeloni and Faia (2013), Angeloni et al. (2010), Christensen
et al. (2011), Collard et al. (2012), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012)). However, only a few studies have assessed the role of a
dynamic use of macroprudential instruments in models of the
housingmarket. Using closed-economymodels of the housingmar-
ket, Kannan et al. (2012) and Angelini et al. (2014) show that an
active use of macroprudential instruments, such as LTV ratios or
capital requirements, generates sizable gains when the economy
is hit by ﬁnancial shocks. Lambertini et al. (2013) show that coun-
tercyclical LTV ratio requirements coupled with an interest-rate
response to ﬁnancial variables is socially optimal in a model with
run-ups in house prices that are induced by news-shock-driven
cycles. Allowing a fraction of households to employ simple mov-
ing-average forecast rules, Gelain et al. (2013) argue that a debt-
to-income type constraint is the most effective macroprudential
tool to dampen the resulting excess volatility in house prices and
debt. In this paper, we extend the standard DSGE housing model
(i.e. a model with heterogeneity in time preferences and housing
as a collateral) by introducing a role for housing market imperfec-
tions in the propagation of international business cycles. Thus, we
contribute to previous ﬁndings by exploring the effectiveness of
dynamic LTV ratio requirements and their interaction with mone-
tary policy to ensure the stability of the ﬁnancial systemwhen both
domestic and external shocks hit the economy.72. The model
The model analyzes two large economies: a domestic and a
foreign country. 8 Our framework combines heterogeneity of time
preferences with collateral constraints. It also features housing mar-
ket imperfections in the propagation of international business cycles.
The domestic economy is populated by two types of households that
trade domestic loanable bonds: patient (denoted by 1) and impatient
(denoted by 2). Patient households have a higher propensity to save,
i.e. b1 > b2. Housing is treated as a durable good with its demand
depending on both the service ﬂow and asset value of housing units.
The service ﬂow is assumed to be proportional to the real value of
the individual housing stock holding. The model allows for con-
strained agents who collateralize the value of their homes. This
ﬁnancial friction results in the familiar ﬁnancial accelerator mecha-
nism. The economy is also populated by perfectly competitive inter-
mediate-goods-producing ﬁrms, retailers that operate in a5 The analysis developed by Justiniano et al. (2014) abstracts from cyclical
ﬂuctuations and varying sources of uncertainty, whereas the ﬁndings presented by
Punzi (2013) are based on a model of the real business.
6 The analysis of policies that regulate cross-border lending and international credit
ﬂows is beyond the scope of this paper.
7 See Bank of International Settlements 2010.
8 For simplicity, the model assumes the domestic and foreign economies are at
equal size.
12 An exogenous change in the valuation of the collateral asset could reﬂect
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and a monetary authority that follows a standard Taylor-type inter-
est rate rule. Finally, the domestic country borrows from the foreign
country which is populated only by patient agents (denoted by s).
2.1. Households
Households supply labour and derive utility from consumption,
cj;t , housing services, hj;t , and hours worked, Lj;t ,
maxE0
X1
t¼0
bj
 t lnðcj;tÞ þ ch;t, lnhj;t  vLg Lj;t g
 
;
where j ¼ 1;2f g denotes the two types of households and , is the
housing weight in the utility. As common in the literature, housing
services are assumed to be proportional to the stock of houses held
by the household and ch;t is a shock to the preference for housing
services.9
2.1.1. Lenders
Patient households accumulate properties for housing pur-
poses, h1;t , trade domestic-currency loanable bonds, b1;t , and for-
eign-currency bonds, bt , and receive dividends from ﬁrms, Ft .
They also invest in physical capital, kt , that is then rented to the
ﬁnal-goods-producing ﬁrms at the rate Rkt . Thus, they maximize
their expected utility subject to the following budget constraint
c1;tþqh;tðh1;tð1dhÞh1;t1Þþqk;tðktð1dkÞkt1Þ
þb1;tþ stbt ¼ . . .¼w1;tL1;tþRkt kt1þ
Rt1b1;t1
pt
þ st 1t1R

t1b

t1
pt
þFt ; ð1Þ
where qh;t is the price of housing, qk;t is the price of capital, w1;t are
real wages, pt ¼ Pt=Pt1 and pt ¼ Pt =Pt1 are, respectively, the
domestic and foreign gross inﬂation rate, and st is the real exchange
rate. The stock of housing and capital depreciate at rates dh and dk,
respectively. All the variables, except for the gross nominal interest
rates on domestic and foreign bonds, Rt , and R

t , are expressed in
real terms. The return on foreign debt depends on a country speciﬁc
risk premium, 1t , that is required for the model to feature a station-
ary distribution.10 This risk premium, 1t , is a positive convex func-
tion that depends on the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic
output:
1t ¼ exp u
stb

t
Yt
 
þ c1;t
 
;
where c1 represents a risk-premium shock.
2.1.2. Borrowers
Impatient households maximize their expected utility subject
to the following budget constraint
c2;t þ qh;tðh2;t  ð1 dhÞh2;t1Þ ¼ w2;tL2;t 
Rt1b2;t1
pt
þ b2;t ; ð2Þ
and a borrowing constraint:
b2t 6 mEt
qh;tþ1ptþ1h2t
Rt
cm;t : ð3Þ
Borrowing is limited to a fraction of the value of the borrowers’
housing stock, where ð1mÞ is the cost that lenders pay when
repossessing the asset in the case of default.11 We assume that
agents’ funding conditions may change due to the occurrence of a9 See, for example Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu et al. (2013).
10 See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for further details.
11 It is possible to show that, in the present framework, impatient households
borrow up to the maximum in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state.
Consider the Euler equation of the impatient household evaluated at the deterministic
steady state l2 ¼ 1 b2b1p
 	
Uc2 > 0, where l2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to
the borrowing constraint.temporary shock to the valuation of the collateral asset, i.e. a credit
shock, cm;t .
12 Impatient households do not have direct access to for-
eign lending.
2.2. Firms and price setting
The Intermediate Sector. There is a continuum of monopolisti-
cally competitive ﬁrms indexed by i 2 ½0;1 that produce interme-
diate goods, yðiÞ, using the following technology:
yðiÞt ¼ cz;t LðiÞ1;t
 	c
LðiÞ2;t
 	1c 1a
kðiÞat1; ð4Þ
where cz;t is an aggregate productivity shock, k is rented capital, L1
and L2 is labour supplied by patient and impatient agents, respec-
tively. As in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we
assume that different labour types are complements.13
We introduce price rigidities in the model following the New
Keynesian literature. Thus, at time t, each intermediate ﬁrm revises
its price with a probability ð1 hÞ as in Calvo (1983), leading to the
following New Keynesian Phillips curve:
log
Pt
Pt1
 
¼ b1 Et log
Ptþ1
Pt
  
þ p log XtX
 
ð5Þ
where p ¼ ð1hÞð1b1hÞh and Xt represents the marginal cost of produc-
tion. Intermediate ﬁrms are owned by the patient households.
The Final-Goods-Producing Firms. The ﬁnal good, Yt , is pro-
duced by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using ytðiÞ units of each type
of intermediate good i and a constant return to scale, a diminishing
marginal product, and a constant elasticity of substitution
technology:
Yt 6
Z 1
0
ytðiÞ
n1
n di
  n
n1
; ð6Þ
where n > 1 is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution parameter.
The price of an intermediate good, ytðiÞ, is denoted by PtðiÞ and is
taken as given by the competitive ﬁnal-good-producing ﬁrms. Solv-
ing for cost minimization yields a constant-price-elasticity demand
function for each goods type i which is homogeneous to degree one
in the total ﬁnal output, ytðiÞ ¼ Pt ðiÞPt
h in
yt , and the domestic price
index Pt ¼
R 1
0 PtðiÞ1ndi
h i1= 1nð Þ
.
2.3. Capital producers
Capital producers combine a fraction of the ﬁnal goods pur-
chased from retailers as investment goods, Ik;t , to combine it with
the existing capital stock in order to produce new capital goods.14
Capital production is subject to an adjustment cost speciﬁed as
wk
2
Ik;t
kt1
 1
 	2
Ik;t1, where wk governs the slope of the capital produc-
ers adjustment cost function. Capital producers choose the level of
Ik;t that maximizes their proﬁts
max
Ik;t
qkt Ik;t  Ik;t þ
wk
2dk
Ik;t
kt1
 dk
 2
kt1
 !
:endogenous variations in the access to credit generated by credit supply shocks
originated in the banking sector (which are not modelled in the present framework).
Thus, this change is independent from the borrowers’ decisions. For a similar
modelling of credit shocks see also Khan and Thomas (2013), Shourideh and Zetlin-
Jones (2012), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
13 The primary motivation for this assumption is to obtain a closed-form solution for
the steady-state of the model.
14 See, among others, Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005) and Christensen
and Dib (2008).
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capital
qkt ¼ 1þ
wk
2dk
Ik;t
Ik;t1
 1
  
; ð7Þ
where qkt is the relative price of capital. In the absence of investment
adjustment costs, qkt ,is constant and equal to one.
The usual capital accumulation equation holds
Ik;t ¼ kt  1 dkð Þkt1: ð8Þ2.4. Housing producers
We assume that housing producers act in a way that is analo-
gous to the production of capital. That is, they combine ﬁnal goods
with the existing housing stock and produce new units of installed
houses. Housing production is subject to an adjustment cost spec-
iﬁed as wh2dh
Ih;t
ht1
 dh
 	2
ht1. For a similar formulation, see Aoki et al.
(2004) and Christensen et al. (2013). From proﬁt maximization, it
is possible to derive the supply of housing
qht ¼ 1þ
wh
2dh
Ih;t
ht1
 dh
  
; ð9Þ
where new housing capital goods are sold at a price qht . This equa-
tion is similar to the Tobin’s q relationship for investment in which
the marginal cost of a unit of housing is related the marginal cost of
adjusting the housing stock.15
The aggregate stock of housing, ht ¼ h1;t þ h2;t , is accumulated
according to
Ih;t ¼ ht  1 dhð Þht1: ð10Þ2.5. Monetary policy
We assume that, in the benchmark economy, the monetary
authority follows a simple interest-rate rule
Rt ¼ ptp
 	/p
er;t ð11Þ
where the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to
deviations of inﬂation from its target, ptp , and er;t is an i.i.d. monetary
policy shock.
2.6. Current account equation
Domestic output, Yt , can be consumed, invested or exported
Yt þ Dt ¼ Ct þ qk;t Ikt þ qh;tIht ;15 A variety of approaches have been followed in the literature regarding the
modelling of the supply of housing. Some authors abstract from housing investment
and assume that the supply of houses is ﬁxed in the short run (i.e. Iacoviello (2005)
and Ferrero (2013)); others assume that housing are produced just by using ﬁnal
goods, thus, the stock of housing evolves according to the standard investment
equation without adjustment costs (i.e. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005, 2009), Calza
et al. (2013) and Justiniano et al. (2014)) and some also assume that housing
producers act in a way that is analogous to the production of capital. That is, they
combine ﬁnal goods with the existing housing stock and produce new units of
installed houses and housing production is subject to an adjustment cost (i.e. Aoki
et al. (2004) and Christensen et al. (2013)). An alternative formulation for the
production of housing would require an explicit production function as for instance in
Iacoviello and Neri (2010). This latter modelling choice would not affect the
transmission of domestic and foreign shocks. Indeed, as already highlighted by
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) ‘‘land works in a way similar to an adjustment cost on
housing, since it limits the extent to which the housing stock can be adjusted. In
response to shocks, a larger land share reduces the volatility of housing investment
and increases the volatility of house prices’’. Our model’s results under an explicit
production function of housing are available upon request.where Ct ¼ c1;t þ c2;t ; Ih;t ¼ ht  1 dhð Þht1; Ik;t ¼ kt  1 dkð Þkt1
and Dt= s b

t  R

t1b

t1
pt
 	
 u2 b

t  b
 2.
The trade balance equals
TBt ¼ Yt  Ct  qk;t Ikt  qh;tIht ¼ Dt ; ð12Þ
and
CAt ¼ TBt þ sðR

t1  1Þbt1
pt
¼ s bt 
bt1
pt
 
:
The last equation states that the current account is the sum of the
service account, i.e. the interest required to service existing debt,
and the trade account, which is the trade balance expressed as
the difference between output, consumption and investments.16
2.7. Rest of the world
The foreign economy is assumed to be a saver economy that run
s a current account surplus. For simplicity, there is only one repre-
sentative household in the foreign economy. This household also
holds all the capital rented to ﬁrms, workers in the production of
consumption goods and saves. The foreign agent problem is similar
to the domestic Savers’. The foreign agent’s expected utility is sum-
marized by
maxE0
X1
t¼0
btscb;t lnðcs;tÞ þ , lnhs;t 
vL
g
Ls;tð Þg
 
;
where bts ¼ bt1 and cb;t is an exogenous shock to the foreign con-
sumer’s impatience.
Firms produce consumption goods, capital and new houses as in
(4)–(11). Adjustment costs are deﬁned identically to those in the
domestic economy. Price rigidities are also introduced as in the
domestic economy, see (5). The foreign monetary authority follows
an interest rate rule as in (12).
2.8. Exogenous factors
Shocks to productivity, cz;t , house preferences, ch;t , domestic
borrowing limits, cm;t , the risk premium, c1;t , and the foreign dis-
count factor, cb;t , follow an autoregressive process of order one
ln ct ¼ qc ln ct1 þ ec;t;
where c ¼ z; h;m; 1; bf g; qc is the persistence parameter and ec;t is a
i.i.d. white noise process with mean zero and variance r2c . Monetary
policy shocks, er;t , are instead i.i.d.
3. Calibration
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency using US
National Accounts and Flow of Funds data over the period
1974:1–2008:1. For the foreign economy, we use data on real
house prices and the short nominal interest rate for the G7 exclud-
ing the US.17 Due to limitations in the availability of cross-country
data on house prices, the sample used for the calibration begins in
1974:1. Figs. 2 and 3 plot the data used in the calibration, whereas
Table 1 reports the targets used for the calibration.
Table 2 reports the parameter values. A ﬁrst set of parameters
describing preferences and technology are calibrated using steady
state targets. The discount factor of the Savers, b1, is set equal to
0.99, such that the average annual rate of return is about 4%. In
the model, the Savers own 100% of physical capital wealth. Thus,16 A similar deﬁnition is found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Ghironi (2006).
17 We thank Luciana Juvenal of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for kindly
providing this data. Source: Fratzscher et al. (2010).
Fig. 2. U.S. Data.
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342 C. Mendicino, M.T. Punzi / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 337–355
Table 1
Targets.
Annual rate of return 4%
Borrowers share housing wealth 40%
Borrowers share of income 60%
Residential investment/GDP 4.56%
Housing wealth to GDP 127.85%
Household Credit to total housing wealth 45.45%
Trade deﬁcit to annual GDP 2.73%
std (real house prices)/std (GDP) 2.98%
std (housing value)/std (household credit) 1.15%
std (US real house prices)/std (foreign real house prices) 1.39%
std (US term interest rates)/std (foreign short term interest rates) 1.26%
std (current account/GDP) 1.09%
Table 2
Parameters’ values.
b1 Discoun factor Savers 0.99 h Calvo parameter 0.67
b2 Discount factor Borrowers 0.95 c labor share in
production
0.057
mL Labor preference
parameter
1 a capital share in
production
0.3
g Laborpreferenceparameter 2 Xss marg.cost of
production
1.10
, Housing preference
parameter
0.17 wh Adj cost housing 0.5
m Loan-to-value ratio 0.73 wk Adj cost capital 0.5
dh Housing depreciation
parameter
0.0089 u risk premium
elasticity
0.001
dk Capital depreciation
parameter
0.025 /p taylor-rule
parameter
1.5
C. Mendicino, M.T. Punzi / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 337–355 343we consider the Savers to represent the top wealth decile of house-
holds in the model economy. Wolff (2010), using the 1983, 1989,
1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2007 Federal Reserve Board’s Surveys
of Consumer Finances, documents that the share of income and the
share of housing wealth held by the top decile of US households are
about 40% and 60%, respectively.18 Thus, we calibrate the discount
factor of the borrowers, b2, and the production parameter, c, in order
to match two ratios for the borrowers: a share of income of about
60% and a share of housing wealth of about 40%. The Borrower’s
discount factor is somewhat lower than the value used by other
authors. 19 However, it does fall in the range of the empirical distri-
bution of discount factors calculated by Carroll and Samwick (1997)
using information on the elasticity of assets with respect to uncer-
tainty, i.e. the two standard deviation bands range in the interval
(0.91, 0.99).
The depreciation of the housing stock, dh, is calibrated in order
to match a ratio of residential investment to GDP of 4.5574%. The
loan-to-value ratio, m, and the housing weight in the utility, ,,
are jointly calibrated to match (i) a ratio of total housing wealth
to GDP of 127.849%, and (ii) a ratio of household credit to total
housing wealth of 45.45%. The resulting loan-to-value ratio is
0.73. Under this calibration, the model is also able to deliver a ratio
of household credit to GDP of 55.30%, as in the data.
The following steady state relationship is used to calibrate the
stock of foreign debt relative to annual GDP ðbÞ in order to match
the US trade deﬁcit to annual GDP ﬁgure of 2.73%:
bð1 RÞ ¼ TB ð13Þ
We borrow the remaining parameters from the existing literature.
Since the labor disutility parameter mL only affects the scale of the18 The Savers’ income share of 40% is also consistent with the long-run average
measured by Piketty and Saez (2003). Updated data through 2010 are available from
Emmanuel Saez’s website.
19 See, among others, Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), Iacoviello
and Neri (2010).economy, we normalize it to one. The parameter g is set to 2 such
that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply equals one. The average
net markup equals 10 per cent and the Calvo parameter, h, is set
to 0.67. We set the capital share in production, a, equal to 0.30
and the depreciation of productive capital dk to 0.025. The adjust-
ment cost parameters are set equal to 0.5.
The second set of parameters determining the stochastic
properties of the model are calibrated to match key moments of
the data. All series are in real terms and their log value is linearly
detrended. First, we parameterize the technology shock, cz;t , fol-
lowing the standard Solow residuals approach. We construct a ser-
ies for the capital stock using end-of-period balance sheet data
from the Flow of Funds Accounts as in Jermann and Quadrini
(2012). Given the value of a and the empirical series for GDP, the
stock of capital and total hours worked we construct the zt series.
The standard deviations of the housing preference shock, rh;t ,
credit shock, rm;t , the monetary policy shock, rr;t , the risk premium
shock, r1;t , and the foreign discount factor, rb;t , are jointly
calibrated to match the unconditional standard deviation of the
current account as a share of domestic GDP, the standard deviation
of real house prices relative to GDP, the standard deviation of hous-
ing value relative to household credit, the relative standard devia-
tion of domestic and foreign real house prices, the relative standard
deviation of domestic and foreign short term interest rates. Hitting
these targets requires an autoregressive process of all shocks equal
to 0.98, except for the monetary policy shock that is assumed to be
i.i.d. Table 2 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
4. Quantitative implications and model dynamics
In this section, we explore the transmission mechanism of
domestic and foreign shocks and we assess the relative importance
of shocks for key macroeconomic variables. Fig. 4 analyzes the
impact of risk premiums (solid line) and foreign preference shocks
(starred line). A negative 1 per cent innovation to the risk
premium, c1;t , increases the willingness of foreign investors to
accumulate U.S. assets. This is because U.S. assets are considered
safer and more liquid, while a positive shock to foreign prefer-
ences, cb;t , makes foreign agents more patient and, thus, more will-
ing to save. Both shocks lead to an increase in capital inﬂows and
thus, a current account deﬁcit. On impact, a 1 per cent increase
in c1;t and cb;t , leads to a change in the current account of 7.5 per
cent. In the case of a foreign preference shock, the current account
quickly returns to the steady state level, and reverses after 5 quar-
ters, whereas a risk premium shock leads to a more persistent cur-
rent account deﬁcit. The greater availability of foreign funds
generates a greater availability of credit to domestic borrowers
as well as an increase in the domestic consumption of both non-
durable goods and housing. Due to the higher demand for housing,
house prices rise which exacerbate the ﬁnancial accelerator effects
linked to the existence of housing collateral. In response to inﬂow
shocks, the model generates co-movement between domestic con-
sumption and housing production. Household credit increases by
about 30 and 50 per cent in response to a 1 per cent innovation
to the foreign preference and risk premium shock, respectively.
The increase in domestic consumption and house prices is more
moderate. Both rise by around 5 per cent for the foreign preference
shocks and 6 per cent for the risk premium shock. The increase in
housing investment is less pronounced. These ﬁndings are consis-
tent with both Bernanke (2005) and Sa and Wieladek (2011) and
support the global savings glut hypothesis.
Figs. 5 and 6 show the impulse responses to domestic shocks. In
Fig. 5, we analyse the effects of a positive one per cent housing
preference shock (solid line) and credit shock (starred line). An
increase in the weight of housing service in the utility function,
ch;t , makes households more willing to consume houses rather than
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Fig. 4. Risk premium shock (solid line) and foreign preference shock (starred line).
20 Productivity shocks have no inﬂuence in the variance decomposition of the
current account, house price and household debt.
21 See among others, Kim and Kim (2003), Faia and Monacelli (2007), Erceg et al.
(2000), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005b, 2007a,b).
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households’ access to domestic credit due to variations in the val-
uation of the collateral asset, cm;t . Both shocks generate an increase
in the policy interest rate, real house prices and household credit.
The increase in the policy interest rate attracts foreign savings
and also makes domestic savers willing to borrow from abroad in
order to lend domestically at a higher rate. Consumption and res-
idential investment also increase. The domestic economy runs a
current account deﬁcit of 0.25 per cent and 0.4 per cent for the
housing preference shock and credit shock, respectively. The
economy displays larger ampliﬁcation in response to a credit shock
relative to a housing preference shock. However, in both cases, the
impact on house prices and the current account is more moderate
than in the case of foreign shocks.
Finally, in Fig. 6, we report the impulse responses to a 1 per cent
positive productivity shock (solid line) as well as an expansionary
monetary policy shock (starred line). Both shocks generate an
increase in house prices, household credit, consumption and resi-
dential investment. However, due to expansionary conditions in
the domestic economy, the saver optimally reduces the foreign
debt, leading to a current account surplus.
In order to understand the relative importance of the shocks in
the theoretical model, we report their contribution to the volatility
of the main variables of interest, such as current account (to GDP),
house prices and household credit. Results are reported in Table 3.
Foreign shocks account for about 50 per cent of the volatility in the
current account to GDP and about 20 per cent of house prices.
Housing preference shocks explain about 70 per cent of the volatil-ity in house prices but only 12 per cent of volatility in the current
account to GDP. Domestic shocks explain almost all the variation of
household credit, with about 66 per cent of its variation accounted
for by the housing preference shock and 30 per cent by credit
shocks. Monetary policy shocks account for 30 per cent of the vol-
atility of the current account to GDP but have a limited effect on
house prices and household credit.
In sum, foreign shocks account for a sizable fraction of volatility
in the current account as a share of GDP, followed by monetary
policy shocks. Housing preference shocks are the most important
domestic shocks in explaining the volatility of house prices and
household credit.20
5. Welfare
In order to draw meaningful conclusions about the desirability
of alternative policies, we compare their performance on the basis
of welfare criteria. By using household welfare as the objective
function of the policy authority, we avoid the problem of adopting
ad hoc loss functions that may not be optimal in this model. The
welfare analysis is based on the approach commonly used in the
DSGE literature.21 The individual welfare of each household is mea-
sured by the conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time t
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Fig. 5. Housing preference shock (solid line) and credit shock (starred line).
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X1
t¼0
btjUðcjt ;hjt; ljtÞ
" #
Thus, we augment the set of equilibrium conditions of the model
with two equations and two unknowns V1t and V2t
V jt ¼ Uðcjt;hjt; ljtÞ þ btj EtVjtþ1; ð14Þ
where Vjt ¼ fV1t ;V2tg denotes the welfare of the Borrowers and
Savers, respectively. We aggregate individual welfare in a social
welfare function, i.e. a weighted average of the welfare of the two
groups of agents:eV t  u1V1t þu2V2t½ ; ð15Þ
where uj ¼ ð1 bjÞ. The weights are chosen such that, given a
constant consumption stream, the Borrowers and the Savers
achieve the same level of utility. Note that, without correcting for
the difference in the discount factors, the social welfare function
would deliver an implicit higher weight on welfare for the Savers.2222 The social weights used in the analysis ensure the same utility weights across
agents that discount future utility at different rates, as in Mendicino and Pescatori
(2008). Let us assume unit weights in (15), i.e. u1 ¼ u2 ¼ 1. In the steady state,
Savers’ lifetime utility is V1 ¼ 1ð1b1 ÞU1, whereas Borrowers’ is V2 ¼ 1ð1b2 ÞU2. Thus,eV  1ð1b1 ÞU1 þ 1ð1b2ÞU2h iwith 1ð1b2Þ < 1ð1b1Þ. Given the parameter values assigned to
b1 and b2, the weight on the welfare of Savers is ﬁve times higher than that on
Borrowers. In contrast, weighting V1 by u1 ¼ ð1 b1Þ and V2 by u2 ¼ ð1 b2Þ, avoids
spurios redistribution effects. See Lambertini et al. (2013) for sensitivity to the use of
alternative weighting criteria.Following previous literature, we compute the welfare implied
by the various rules, conditional on the initial state (t ¼ 0) being
the deterministic steady state.23 As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2007a), we assess the effects of simple policy rules, i.e. rules that
imply a response of the policy instrument to a few observable mac-
roeconomic variables. These variables guarantee local uniqueness of
the rational expectations equilibrium and are optimal in the sense
that they maximize social welfare. Thus, the optimized interest-rate
and LTV ratio rules are ranked in terms of social welfare levels. The
welfare effects of the alternative rules are quantiﬁed on the basis of a
consumption-equivalent measure, i.e. the percentage increase in
individual consumption that would make the welfare of each type
of agent under the baseline policy equal to the welfare under the
optimized rule. Table 4 panel A.1 (rule i) reports the individual
and social welfare levels under the baseline policy used for the cal-
ibration of the model, i.e. a monetary policy rule that features a 1:5
interest rate response to inﬂation coupled with a constant LTV ratio
m equal to 0:73.6. Optimized policy rules
In recent decades, there has been a great deal of emphasis on
assessing the ability of monetary policy to dampen housing and23 See for instance Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007a) and Faia and Monacelli (2007).
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Fig. 6. Productivity shock (solid line) and Monetary policy shock (starred line).
Table 3
Variance decomposition.
Housing preference ðch;tÞ Monetary policy ðer;tÞ Credit shock ðcm;tÞ Risk premium ðc1;tÞ Foreign Disc. factor ðcb;tÞ
CAt 12.15 33.22 5.22 49.07 0.03
qh;t 70.28 0.25 8.77 20.02 0.04
b2t 66.55 0.63 30.74 1.99 0.01
The table reports the variance share of key shocks of the forecast errors of the current account ðCAtÞ, house prices ðqh;t and household debt ðb2tÞ.
Table 4
Welfare gains – interest rate rules.
Welfare
Social Savers Borrowers
A.1 Ad Hoc interest-rate rules (m = 0.73)
(i) /p ¼ 1:5; 0.2865 5.9140 4.5472
(ii) /p ¼ 1:5; /y ¼ 0:5; 0.2826 5.9241 4.4680
(0.0101) (0.3952)
A.2 Optimized interest-rate rules (m = 0.73)
(iii) /p ¼ 7:1; /y ¼ 0; /b ¼ 1:8; 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
(10.4580) (2.2076)
(iv) /p ¼ 4; /y ¼ 0; /q ¼ 1:9; 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
(8.6967) (0.6954)
Second-order approximation. In parenthesis, individual welfare gains w.r.t. the baseline policy,
i.e. interest-rate response to inﬂation coupled with a constant LTV ratio, rule (i).
Negative welfare gains indicate losses. /i ¼ ½p; y; b; q indicates the inﬂation coefﬁcients in the interest-rate rule.
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Fig. 7. Welfare w.r.t. interest-rate response to ﬁnancial variables.
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of a new policy framework that restrains the build-up of credit and
house price dynamics has been central to both policy and academic
debates. A large number of papers explores the macroeconomic
effects of macroprudential policies, such as LTV ratios, capital
requirements and reserve requirements in general equilibrium mod-
els. In the following, we ﬁrst explore the optimality of an interest-
rate response to ﬁnancial variables. Further, we study the effects of
alternative LTV ratio policies in stabilizing ﬂuctuations in household
credit and housing prices.25
6.1. Interest rate response to ﬁnancial variables
First, we investigate whether monetary policy should explicitly
target ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial variables. Thus, we evaluate the
welfare implications of alternative interest-rate rules that react
to either changes in household credit or house prices
Rt ¼ ptp
 	/p yt
yt1
 /y xt
xt1
 /x
er;t ð16Þ
where yt is output and xt ¼ fbt ; qtg. 26 Table 4 (panel A.2) reports the
combination of parameters that deliver the highest welfare given an
interest-rate rule that targets either household credit (rule iii) or
house prices (rule iv). Both rules feature a moderate response to24 See, among others, Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Faia
and Monacelli (2007) and Iacoviello (2005).
25 This model is linearized around a deterministic steady-state. Thus, it is not able to
deal with bubbles or other types of unsustainable dynamics. Hence, the purpose of
the proposed macroprudential policies is to stabilize house price cycles and credit
cycles rather than correcting imbalances.
26 We search over a three dimensional grid, with the ranges for the three parameters
being [1.1,10] for /p , [0,3] for /y , and [0,3] for /x . The grid step for each parameter is
0.1.ﬁnancial variables and no response to GDP growth. 27 The optimized
rules also require an aggressive response to inﬂation.
It is important to highlight that the social welfare maximizing
interest-rate response to ﬁnancial variables is not a Pareto
improvement beginning from the baseline policy, i.e. (rule i). In
other words, under an interest-rate response to ﬁnancial variables,
the welfare of one group of agents is increased at the cost of a
reduction in the welfare of the other group. Responding to ﬁnancial
variables improves social welfare only due to the large individual
welfare gains accrued to the Savers.
A nominal interest-rate response to changes in ﬁnancial vari-
ables implies a more contained response of the real interest rate
to shocks and thus, a less sizable effect on the housing investment
and borrowing decisions of households. Let us consider the case of
an unanticipated expansionary of monetary policy. See Fig. 8. This
shock induces agents to increase their current expenditures.
Demand pressure raises current inﬂation and the current ex-post
real rate declines. Similar to Ferrero (2013), expansionary mone-
tary policy generate a lower real interest rate and an increase in
house prices.28 Given the collateral constraint, which allows house-
holds to borrow more against the higher value of their house, and
given the lower desire to save, Borrowers increase their level of
indebtedness and housing investment. As implied by the Euler equa-
tion, a reduction in real interest rates affects the Savers’ consump-
tion/saving plan allocation. As a result, they reduce investment in
housing. When the interest rate reacts to the increase in ﬁnancial
variables (rule iii) and (iv) the real interest rate declines by less.27 As reported in (rule ii), a positive response to output growth reduces social
welfare even in the case of the baseline interest-rate rule that does not include a
response to changes in ﬁnancial variables.
28 However, the present model can generate this result abstracting from exchange
rate regime.
Table 5
Welfare gains – LTV ratio rules.
Welfare
Social Savers Borrowers
B.1 Optimized LTV ð/p ¼ 7:1; /y ¼ 0; /b ¼ 1:8Þ
m ¼ 0:73 (rule iii) 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
(v) ub ¼ 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
 
(vi) uy ¼ 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
 
(vii) uq ¼ 1:4 0.7229 21.7343 10.1121
(6.0497) (35.0629)
(viii) uq=q ¼ 0 0.3636 15.8605 4.1007
 
B.2 Optimized LTV ð/p ¼ 4; /y ¼ 0; /q ¼ 1:9Þ
m ¼ 0:73 (rule iv) 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
(ix) ub ¼ 0 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
 
(x) uy ¼ 0 0.3629 14.2531 4.4076
 
(xi) uq ¼ 1:8 0.6525 54.4806 2.1534
(49.5222) (10.6590)
(xii) uq=q ¼ 1:9 0.5723 52.5722 0.9320
(46.6958) (15.9519)
Second-order approximation. In parenthesis, individual welfare gains w.r.t. the constant LTV., policy, i.e. rule (iii) in PANEL B.1 AND rule (iv) in PANEL B.2. Negative welfare
gains indicate losses.
/i; with i ¼ ½p; y; b; q; indicates the coefﬁcients in the interest-rate rule, whereas uj , with j ¼ ½q; b, indicates the coefﬁcients in the LTV rule.
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Fig. 8. Monetary policy shock under rule i (starred line), rule iii (solid line) and rule iv (dashed line).
348 C. Mendicino, M.T. Punzi / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 337–355Thus, Savers beneﬁt from a less substantial reduction in their inter-
est rate income and, in turn, reduce less of their housing investment.
Since this policy limits the ampliﬁcation effect of the collateral con-
straint, by mitigating the increase in housing value, Borrowers suffer
from a reduced increase in the availability of credit. The effect ismore sizable under an interest-rate response to variations in house-
hold credit.
Fig. 7 shows how individual and social welfare change with
respect to an interest-rate response to the ﬁnancial variables while
leaving the output and inﬂation coefﬁcients unchanged to the
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Fig. 9. Monetary policy shock under rule iii (solid line) and rule vii (dashed-dotted line).
Table 6
Level and stabilization effect – interest rate rules.
(A) (B)
Monetary Policy: /p=7.1;/y=0; /b=1.8; /p=4;/y=0; /q=1.9;
LTV Policy: m ¼ 0:73 uq ¼ 1:4 m ¼ 0:73 uq ¼ 1:8 uq=q ¼ 1:9
(rule iii) (rule vii) (rule iv) (rule xi) (rule xii)
(I) std relative to baseline
b2/Y 0.9527 0.2426 0.8857 0.9248 0.9092
qh/Y 1.0753 0.6034 0.9161 1.1305 1.0256
IH/Y 1.0604 0.5875 0.8836 1.0511 0.9542
C/Y 0.6724 0.3184 0.6652 0.4411 0.4040
C1/Y 0.4704 0.2434 0.5261 0.3292 0.2963
C2/Y 1.3191 0.5437 1.1996 1.6283 1.5046
Real Rate 0.9945 0.3603 1.2585 1.2476 1.2016
BF/Y 1.2082 0.3499 1.1591 1.1591 0.4684
qh/qh 1.0048 1.3553 1.0070 1.6148 0.9200
(II) mean relative to baseline
b2/Y 1.1940 2.6539 1.0481 1.0481 2.0307
qh/Y 1.3335 0.3670 1.1815 1.1815 0.0600
IH/Y 0.8474 1.6065 0.7854 0.7854 1.1991
Second-order approximation. Stochastic mean and standard deviations under the full set of shocks computed under the optimized interest-RATE rules. The table report the
values in percentage difference w.r.t. baseline policy (rule i).
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optimized responses to inﬂation and output deliver higher social
and Savers welfare even in the absence of a response to ﬁnancial
variables, i.e. /b ¼ /q ¼ 0. Regarding (rule iv), the Borrowers
welfare is always below the baseline policy (rule i) welfare level,
independently of the response to house prices. In contrast, for
the Borrowers welfare to be above the level reached under the
baseline policy, (rule iii) would require a much more aggressive
response to credit growth than the coefﬁcient that maximizes
social welfare.6.2. Dynamic LTV requirements
Second, we investigate the implications of adopting dynamic
LTV ratio requirements as macroprudential tools. In particular,
we allow the LTV ratio to vary in a counter-cyclical manner around
a pre-established steady state cap, m. We explore the effectiveness
of a countercyclical LTV ratio rule of the following class
mt
m
¼ xt
x
 	ux
;
Table 7
Welfare gains and sources of ﬂuctuations.
Social welfare Savers’ gains Borrowers’ gains
(A) Baseline policy
rule i /p ¼ 1:5; m ¼ 0:73
all shocks 0.2865  
domestic 0.2662  
foreign 0.1541  
(B) Constant LTV
rule iii /p ¼ 7:1;/y ¼ 0;/b ¼ 1:8; m ¼ 0:73
all shocks 0.3636 (10.4420) (2.1933)
domestic 0.4272 (19.1439) (1.4080)
foreign 0.0802 (3.6539) (3.6013)
rule iv /p ¼ 4;/y ¼ 0;/q ¼ 1:9; m ¼ 0:73
all shocks 0.3629 (8.6966) (0.6955)
domestic 0.4243 (17.1122) (0.0077)
foreign 0.0851 (3.9875) (2.7922)
(C) Dynamic LTV
rule vii /p ¼ 7:1;/y ¼ 0;/b ¼ 1:8; uq ¼ 1:4
all shocks 0.7229 (17.1405) (32.0822)
domestic 0.5758 (11.7185) (21.9835)
foreign 0.4954 (13.8812) (23.5304)
rule xi /p ¼ 4;/y ¼ 0;/q ¼ 1:9; uq ¼ 1:8
all shocks 0.6525 (62.5249) (11.2804)
domestic 0.5119 (5.0813) (14.8115)
foreign 0.4508 (30.9152) (2.7749)
rule xii /p ¼ 4;/y ¼ 0;/q ¼ 1:9; uq=q ¼ 1:9
all shocks 0.5723 (59.4514) (16.5364)
domestic 0.3079 (26.9073) (17.8457)
foreign 0.5041 (52.7356) (7.0935)
Second-order approximation. Social welfare level and individual welfare gains w.r.t. the baseline policy (rule i).
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ﬁnancial conditions, i.e. xt ¼ qht ; b2t; yt ; q
h
t
qt
n o
and ux P 0. The opti-
mality of a countercyclical response of the LTV ratio to output,
household credit and house prices has already been investigated
in the context of closed economy models of the housing market.29
In this paper, we also consider the differential between domestic
and foreign real house prices, a variable that may capture global
ﬁnancial cycles.
Table 5 reports the coefﬁcients of the LTV ratio rules that
respond to each of the selected variables and deliver the highest
welfare. The analysis is conducted conditional on monetary policy
being conducted as in the optimized (rule iii) or (iv). We also
include the welfare levels under the constant LTV ratio, i.e.
mt ¼ m, for reference. We compute the welfare gains of adopting
each optimized LTV ratio rule with respect to the policy of a con-
stant LTV ratio by compensating variations. That is, we measure
the percentage change in consumption under the constant LTV
ratio case that would give households the same unconditional
expected utility as in the stochastic economy under each optimized
rule.
Panel B.1 of Table 5 explores the optimality of an active LTV
ratio policy when monetary policy follows (rule iii). LTV rules that
respond to household credit, output or the house price differential
are not optimal. In contrast, adopting a dynamic LTV ratio rule that
responds in a countercyclical manner to house prices increases
social welfare and results in a Pareto improvement. Further, allow-
ing for a countercyclical response to house prices resolves the
trade-off between Borrowers’ and Savers’ welfare introduced by
the interest-rate response to household debt. Indeed, (rule vii)
implies a welfare level for both agents that is higher than the level
under both (rule iii) and the baseline policy (rule i) (see Table 4).
Panel B.2 of Table 5 reports the results for the optimized LTV
ratio rules under the assumption that monetary policy follows
(rule iv). Allowing for a countercyclical response of the LTV ratio29 See for instance Lambertini et al. (2013) and Angelini et al. (2014).to either changes in house prices or in the house price differential
improves upon a constant LTV ratio in terms of social welfare.
However, differently from (rule vii), the optimized LTV ratio (rule
xi) and (xii) exacerbate the trade-off between Savers’ and
Borrowers’ welfare. In fact, compared with (rule iv), both rules
induce even larger gains for the Savers and larger costs for the
Borrowers. The Borrowers’ welfare level under (rule xi) and (xii)
remains below the welfare level reached under the baseline policy,
i.e. (rule i).
In terms of individual welfare, the largest gains for the Savers
are experienced under the optimized interest rate rule that
responds to changes in house prices coupled with a LTV ratio rule
that optimally responds to changes in house price (rule xi)
followed by a LTV ratio that respond to changes in the house price
differential (rule xii). In contrast, the Borrowers are better off under
the optimized interest-rate response to household credit coupled
with the optimal LTV ratio response to house prices (rule vii).
Across all rules, the greatest social welfare is reached under the
policy that features an interest rate response to credit growth
and a countercyclical response of the LTV ratio to house prices
(rule vii). Notice that from the starting point of the baseline policy
(rule i) and a constant LTV policy (rule iii), (rule vii) leads to a
Pareto improvement.
In order to develop some intuition about the beneﬁcial effects of
a policy that optimally combines an interest-rate response to
household credit with a LTV ratio response to house prices, Fig. 9
compares the effects of an unanticipated monetary policy loosen-
ing under (rule iii) and (vii). A LTV ratio that countercyclically
reacts to changes in house prices, reduces the increase credit avail-
ability in response to an expansionary shock. A countercyclical LTV
prevents a strong relaxation of the collateral constraint stemming
from upward pressure on house prices. This, in turn, implies a lar-
ger decline in the real interest rate compared with the case of a
constant LTV ratio (rule iii). Thus, the increase in the availability
of credit is dampened even though servicing loans is less costly.
This policy improves the Borrowers’ ability to invest in housing.
As for the Savers, the larger decline in their interest income results
0 5 10 15
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Consumption             
0 5 10 15
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Foreign Debt            
0 5 10 15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Current Account(%gdp)   
0 5 10 15
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
Policy Interest Rate    
0 5 10 15
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
House Prices            
0 5 10 15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
House Price Differential
0 5 10 15
0.2
0.25
0.3
House Value             
0 5 10 15
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Residential Investment  
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Household Debt          
Fig. A.1. Risk premium shock (solid line) and foreign preference shock (starred line).
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initial effect is, however, counter-balanced by a larger increase
over the medium term. Similar results hold for the other shocks.
7. Understanding the mechanism
In the following, we evaluate the ability of the optimized rules
to stabilize macroeconomic and ﬁnancial cycles. Further, we assess
the role of alternative sources of business cycle ﬂuctuations in
determining social welfare gains.
7.0.1. Stabilization effect
This paper’s analysis follows the more recent strand of the mon-
etary policy literature and directly, evaluates alternative policies on
their ability to improve social welfare. Thus, we do not target the
volatility of a particular set of variables, as in the traditional loss
function approach. The results presented in the previous section,
however, show that the Pareto-improving policy, i.e. (rule vii), mit-
igates ﬁnancial cycles and dampens the response of the real interest
rate to shocks when compared to the baseline case (rule i).
In the following, we assess the stabilization effects of the alter-
native policies presented in Section 6 by investigating their impact
on the unconditional volatility of key variables. See Table 6 (panel
I).30 Panel A of Table 6 considers the optimized interest-rate rule that30 The model-based standard deviations are reported in terms of their ratios to the
values delivered under the baseline policy (rule i). Thus, ﬁgures larger than unity
indicate higher volatility than what is delivered by the baseline policy (rule i). The
opposite is true for values below one.targets changes in household credit, whereas Panel B refers to the
interest-rate rule that targets changes in real house prices. For each
interest rate rule, we consider both a constant LTV and a countercy-
clical LTV ratio.
Compared to the baseline policy, all optimized rules reduce the
volatility of both household credit and total consumption relative
to output. The interest-rate rule that targets house prices (rule
iv) also reduces the volatility of house prices and housing invest-
ment. In contrast, the interest-rate rule that targets credit growth
(rule iii) reduces the volatility of the real interest rate. LTV ratios
that optimally respond to ﬁnancial variables (rule vii, xi and xii)
further reduce the volatility of total consumption to output. Note
that a LTV ratio response to the differential between domestic
and foreign house prices (rule xii) also reduces the volatility of
both international credit ﬂows and the house price differential.
Overall, the policy (rule vii) is more successful than other policies
in reducing the volatility of both ﬁnancial variables and the real
interest rate.
It is important to highlight that the reduction in the volatility of
total consumption featured by all optimized policies is driven by a
reduction in the volatility of the consumption by Savers. In fact,
under most optimized rules, the volatility of Borrower’ consump-
tion is larger than under the baseline policy (rule i). The only
exception is (rule vii), i.e. the interest-rate rule that responds to
credit growth coupled with a LTV ratio that countercyclically
responds to house prices. Differently from other policies, (rule
vii) is a Pareto improvement. See Tables 4 and 5.
The underlying mechanism behind the welfare and macroeco-
nomic effects of (rule vii) is linked to two main features of the the-
oretical model: collateralizes debt and debt contracts in nominal
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Fig. A.2. Housing preference shock (solid line) and credit shock (starred line).
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terms introduce private risk generated by the uncertain returns.31
Thus, in our model, the policy authority can improve social welfare
by stabilizing the ex-post real interest rate which helps to offset
the distortion related to the presence of debt contracts in nominal
terms. The stabilization of the real interest rate resulting from an
interest-rate response to household credit reduces the volatility of
the interest income of Savers which in turn helps to stabilize their
housing investment and consumption over the cycle. This policy is
therefore welfare improving for the Savers.
The reduction in the volatility of the debt-services also reduces
the uncertainty about the repayment of the debt for the Borrowers.
However, by reducing the volatility of ﬁnancial variables, this pol-
icy also limits the ampliﬁcation effect of the collateral constraint.
An interest-rate response to household credit coupled with a con-
stant LTV, i.e. (rule iii), reduces the ability of Borrowers to smooth
consumption and investment over the cycle. Thus, it makes this
group of agents worse off compared to the baseline policy (rule
i). Panel A documents the increase in the volatility of Borrowers’
consumption under (rule iii).
The additional use of a countercyclical response of the LTV to
house prices (rule vii) tightens the collateral constraint during
periods of expansion and relaxes the borrowing constraint during31 See Christiano et al. (2004, 2010) for an analysis on the distortion related to the
presence of assets in nominal terms in a model with ﬁnancial frictions at the ﬁrms’
level, and Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) for further discussion on the implications
of nominal debt contracts in a model with collateralized household debt.periods of recession. This helps Borrowers smooth consumption
and housing investment over time and improves their welfare.
Table 6 also discloses the changes in the level of aggregate vari-
ables under each policy experiment. Household credit and housing
investment are highest under (rule vii). This result is in line with
the stabilization properties of the same policy framework. Overall,
the large social welfare gains reported under (rule vii) are associ-
ated with sizable stabilization effects and a higher long-run level
of credit, investment and, thus, consumption, as summarized by
the higher social welfare level.7.0.2. Domestic vs external shocks
The analysis conducted in this paper does not attempt to design
optimal policies conditional on some particular shocks. Instead, it
is based on the assumption that various sources of business cycle
ﬂuctuations can affect the economy. Thus, we do not target the
smoothing out of speciﬁc shocks. In the following, we investigate
what happens when the economy is only subject to either domes-
tic or external shocks. To address this question, we compare the
performance of the optimized policy rules under three cases: all
shocks, only domestic shocks, only foreign shocks.
Table 7 reports the results. For each set of shocks, Panel A of
Table 7 reports the welfare levels under the baseline policy (rule
i), whereas Panel B reports the results under the optimized inter-
est-rate rules that target household credit (rule iii), or house prices
(rule iv). Panel C reports the results under the countecyclical LTV
ratio policies. All welfare gains are computed with respect to the
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Fig. A.3. Productivity shock (solid line) and monetary policy shock (starred line).
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shocks are the same as in Tables 4 and 5.
First, let us consider the Pareto improving policy (rule vii). We
ﬁnd that the optimality of this policy is not driven by particular
sources of ﬂuctuations. In fact, both domestic and foreign shocks
account for a similar fraction of the welfare gains delivered by (rule
vii). It is important to highlight that, independently of the sources
of ﬂuctuations considered, this remains the only improving Pareto
policy. Thus, both Savers and Borrowers beneﬁt from a LTV ratio
rule that optimally responds to ﬂuctuations in house prices cou-
pled with the optimized interest-rate rule that responds to credit
growth independently of the sources of ﬂuctuations hitting our
model economy.
Regarding the other rules, the ranking across (rule i), (iii) and
(iv) holds only under domestic shocks,. In contrast, under the
occurrence of foreign shocks, the gains implied by an interest-rate
response to domestic ﬁnancial variables vanish if the LTV ratio is
constant. See Panel B. Foreign shocks strongly favour a countercy-
clical LTV ratio. In particular, (rule xii) is the social welfare maxi-
mizing rule. Differently from (rule vii), the social gains from the
use of this policy framework reﬂect the large welfare gains accrued
to the Savers. It is important to notice that in the current setup,
patient households trade both domestic-currency bonds and
foreign-currency bonds. Thus, this group of agents beneﬁts from
the stabilization of international credit ﬂows implied by a conter-
cyclical LTV ratio response to ﬂuctuations in the house price differ-
ential. Table 6, Panel B reports the standard deviation of the foreign
debt to GDP under the alternative optimized rules.8. Conclusion
The latest U.S. housing boom was coupled with both a widening
of the current account deﬁcit and increasing capital inﬂows. In this
paper, we contribute to the understanding of (i) the inter-linkages
between the evolution of the U.S. current account balance and
house prices, (ii) the effects of macro-prudential policy and its
interaction with monetary policy. We do this in a framework that
mimics the dynamics of the housing market and the current
account. With this purpose in mind, we develop a quantitative
model of two large economies calibrated to match key features
of the U.S. and the rest of the G7 countries.
Our results suggest that risk premium shocks account for a large
fraction of variation in the U.S. current account as a share of GDP
and a non-negligible fraction of the volatility of U.S. house prices.
Monetary policy shocks account for a substantial fraction of varia-
tions in the current account but have a limited effect on house
prices, while other domestic shocks, such as housing preference
and credit shocks, do not account for a sizable fraction of ﬂuctua-
tions in the current account.
In the context of this model, we explore the stabilization effects
of monetary and LTV ratio policy which target ﬁnancial variables.
The design of a new policy framework able to stabilize credit and
house price dynamics is central to the current policy debate. Unlike
previous papers, we explore the effects of dynamic LTV ratio
requirements in a model that also considers external shocks. We
ﬁnd that a policy that features a counterciclycal LTV ratio that
responds to house price dynamics and an interest-rate rule that
354 C. Mendicino, M.T. Punzi / Journal of Banking & Finance 49 (2014) 337–355targets credit dampens macroeconomic and ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations
and is Pareto improving.
Appendix A. Housing production
In the following, we introduce housing production which com-
bines labor supplied by both agents, ﬁxed capital and land in the
production function, as in Iacoviello and Neri, 2010. This set-up
does not change the conclusions obtained relative to the case of
adjustment costs in housing investment.
The production of new houses follows a CobbDouglas speciﬁca-
tion form, such as:
IHt ¼ ch;t LH1;t
 	c
LH2;t
 	1c 1ahaL
kahh;t1l
aL
t1;
where LH1 and L
H
2 is labor supplied by the Savers and Borrowers in
the housing sector, respectively. kh is capital used in the housing
sector and l is land. Supply of land is ﬁxed and equal to 1. Similar
to Iacoviello and Neri, 2010, land plays a role of housing adjustment
cost.
Both households work in the two production sectors. In order to
keep the set-up comparable with the case of adjustment costs in
housing investment, we assume that each sector pays the same
wage to the labor supplied by each household. Therefore
w1;t ¼ wY1;t ¼ wH1;t and w2;t ¼ wY2;t ¼ wH2;t .
The intermediate good production is also modiﬁed, as follows:
yðiÞt ¼ cz;t LðiÞY1;t
 	c
LðiÞY2;t
 	1c 1a
kac;t1;
where LY1 and L
Y
2 is labor supplied by the Savers and Borrowers in the
good sector, respectively, and kc is capital in the consumption
sector.
Total capital is equal to the sum of capital used in each sector,
kt ¼ kc;t þ kh;t .
The Saver owns all the capital stock and land, which rent to
ﬁrms. Therefore, the new budget constraint for the Saver is:
c1;t þ qh;tðh1;t  ð1 dhÞh1;t1Þ þ qk;tðkt  ð1 dkÞkt1Þ
þ Rt1b1;t1
pt
þ st 1t1R

t1b

t1
pt
þ ql;t lt ¼ b1;t þ stbt þw1;tL1;t
þ Rkct kc;t1 þ Rkht kh;t1 þ ðRHt þ ql;tÞlt1 þ Ft
and
L1;t ¼ LY1;t þ LH1;t;
ql is the price of land, R
kc;Rkh and RH are real rental rate for capital in
good sector, housing sector and land, respectively.
All the rest is unchanged.
We calibrate the parameters of the new function in such a way
to get a closer steady-state as in the case of ﬁxed housing produc-
tion. We assume perfect substitution of labor across sectors. Simi-
lar to Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri, 2010, we
calibrate the share of land in the housing production aL ¼ 0:10 and
the capital share in the housing production ah ¼ 0:10.
Figs. A.1, A.2, A.3 reports the impulse responses for each shock
under a model with housing production function. A different set-
up for the production of new houses leave the responses
unchanged. All variables, including residential investment, lead
to the same response after a shock similar to the baseline model.
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